I became convinced that the following scenario is true: CIA people killed Kennedy. Either it was an outright project of Headquarters with the approval of McCone or it was done outside, perhaps under the direction of Dulles and Bissell. It was done in retaliation for Kennedy’s reneging on a secret agreement with Dulles to support the invasion of Cuba.796
A lie to big to fail by Lisa Peace p. 472
It is probable they part of the fabric of the CIA under atomic testing built from DNA studies the Barrack Obama Jr and other sleepers.
RFK was staying in Manchurian Candidate filmaker John Frankenhiemer house and headed with Richard Nixon brother Don Nixon to the AEC of Nevada the day he was shot.
The Manchurian Candidate (1962 film) – The Manchurian Candidate is a 1962 American neo-noir psychological political thriller film directed and produced by John Frankenheimer. Wikipedia
Robert Kennedy spent day of June 4, 1968, at Malibu home of his friend John Frankenheimer (born February 19, 1930), who then drove RFK to Ambassador Hotel in Los Angeles. RFK’s death helped to drive Frankenheimer into years of what he called “deep depression” and drinking.
John Alexander McCone (January 4, 1902 – February 14, 1991) was an American businessman and politician who served as Director of Central Intelligence from 1961 to 1965, during the height of the Cold War.[1][2]
John A. McCone was born in San Francisco, California, on January 4, 1902. His father ran iron foundries across California, a business founded in Nevada in 1860 by McCone’s grandfather. He graduated from the University of California, Berkeley in 1922 with a BS in Mechanical Engineering, beginning his career in Los Angeles’ Llewellyn Iron Works.[1] He rose swiftly and in 1929, when several works merged to become the Consolidated Steel Corporation, he became executive vice president. He also founded Bechtel-McCone.[3]
He also worked for ITT. In 1946, the General Accounting Office implied that McCone was a war profiteer, stating that McCone and his associates of the California Shipbuilding Corporation had made $44 million on an investment of $100,000.[4] McCone’s political affiliation was with the Republican Party.[3]
He married Theiline McGee Pigott on August 29, 1962, at St. Anne’s Chapel of the Sacred Heart Villa in Seattle, Washington.[8]
McCone was not Kennedy’s first choice; the President had tentatively offered the job to Clark Clifford, his personal lawyer, who politely refused (Clifford would later serve as Secretary of Defense for Lyndon Johnson); and then to Fowler Hamilton, a Wall Street lawyer with experience in government service during the Roosevelt and Truman administrations. Hamilton accepted, but when a problem developed at the Agency for International Development, he was shifted there.[9] Thus Kennedy, urged on by his brother Robert, turned to McCone.[9]
McCone was a key figure in the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (EXCOMM) during the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. In the Honeymoon telegram of September 20, 1962, he insisted that the CIA remain imaginative when it came to Soviet weapons policy towards Cuba, as a September 19 National Intelligence Estimate had concluded it unlikely that nuclear missiles would be placed on the island. The telegram was so named because McCone sent it while on his honeymoon in Paris, France, accompanied not only by his bride, Theiline McGee Pigott but by a CIA cipher team.[10]
McCone’s suspicions of the inaccuracy of this assessment proved to be correct, as it was later found out the Soviet Union had followed up its conventional military buildup with the installation of MRBMs (Medium Range Ballistic Missiles) and IRBMs (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles), sparking off the crisis in October when they were later spotted by CIA’s Lockheed U-2 surveillance flights.
While McCone was DCI, the CIA was involved in many covert plots; according to Admiral Stansfield Turner (who himself later served as DCI from 1977 to 1981, under President Jimmy Carter), these included:[11]
In the Dominican Republic, the CIA had armed and organized the assassination of President Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina. Shortly before his own assassination, President Kennedy ordered the CIA to abort their plot to murder of President Molina, which, echoing the CIA-backed murder of Congolese founding father Lumumba under the purview of McCone’s fired predecessor Allen Dulles, was ultimately disobeyed.[12] It was argued that after the CIA funded and organized a group of highly motivated locals, it was at that point beyond the capabilities of the powerful intelligence agency to thwart. It is unclear, however, whether CIA had at any point actually attempted to do this.[13]
In Laos, the CIA backed the Hmong (then known by the derogatory name Meo) people of the highlands to fight a counterinsurgency. This set off a complicated three-way civil war that hit the Hmong hard.[14]
In Ecuador, the CIA helped overthrow President José Velasco Ibarra. His replacement didn’t last long before the CIA turned on him, looking for greater stability and allegiance.[15]
McCone was also involved in the 1964 Brazilian coup d’état,[20] his friendship with ITT president Harold Geneen was a sizable conflict of interest as Geneen’s company stood to lose its Brazilian subsidiary if president João Goulart nationalized it.[21] After the CIA coup deposed Goulart with President Johnson’s vociferous urging, McCone would go on work for ITT.[3]
Regarding U.S. support of the coup in South Vietnam against President Ngo Dinh Diem, McCone aligned himself with President Kennedy, who had called the idea of yet another coup d’etat “silly”,[22] at least initially. In any case, both were overruled by November 1963, when even before Kennedy’s murder and the installation of a new, more militaristic Lyndon B. Johnson administration, the State Department had already, via Ambassador Lodge, effectively allowed Diem’s murder and the Vietnamese coup d’etat to proceed.[23][24]
McCone resigned from his position of DCI in April 1965, believing himself to be unappreciated by President Lyndon B. Johnson, who, he complained, would not read his reports, including on the need for full-fledged inspections of Israeli nuclear facilities.[26] Before his resignation, McCone submitted a final memorandum regarding the war in Vietnam to President Johnson, arguing that Johnson’s plan of attack was too limited in scope to successfully defeat the Hanoi regime; he further asserted that public support (in the United States and abroad) for any effort in North Vietnam would erode if the plan went unchanged:
Dear Mr. President:
I remain concerned, as I have said before to you, Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara, over the limited scale of air action against North Vietnam which we envision for the next few months.
Specifically I feel that we must conduct our bombing attacks in a manner that will begin to hurt North Vietnam badly enough to cause the Hanoi regime to seek a political way out through negotiation rather than expose their economy to increasingly serious levels of destruction. By limiting our attacks to targets like bridges, military installations and lines of communication, in effect we signal to the Communists that our determination to win is significantly modified by our fear of widening the war.
…
If this situation develops and lasts several months or more, I feel world opinion will turn against us, Communist propaganda will become increasingly effective, and indeed domestic support of our policy may erode. I therefore urge that as we deploy additional troops, which I believe necessary, we concurrently hit the north harder and inflict greater damage. In my opinion, we should strike their petroleum supplies, electric power installations, and air defense installations (including the SAM sites which are now being built).
…
I am not talking about bombing centers of population or killing innocent people, though there will of course be some casualties. I am proposing to “tighten the tourniquet” on North Vietnam so as to make the Communists pause to weigh the losses they are taking against their prospects for gains. We should make it hard for the Viet Cong to win in the south and simultaneously hard for Hanoi to endure our attacks in the north. I believe this course of action holds out the greatest promise we can hope for in our effort to attain our ultimate objective of finding a political solution to the Vietnam problem.
— John A. McCone, Director of Central Intelligence, (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXII. Top Secret)[27]
Throughout his career, McCone served on numerous commissions that made recommendations on issues as diverse as civilian applications of military technology and the Watts Riots.[28]
In creating the AEC, Congress declared that atomic energy should be employed not only in the form of nuclear weapons for the nation’s defense, but also to promote world peace, improve the public welfare and strengthen free competition in private enterprise.[8] At the same time, the McMahon Act which created the AEC also gave it unprecedented powers of regulation over the entire field of nuclear science and technology. It furthermore explicitly prevented technology transfer between the United States and other countries, and required FBI investigations for all scientists or industrial contractors who wished to have access to any AEC controlled nuclear information. The signing was the culmination of long months of intensive debate among politicians, military planners and atomic scientists over the fate of this new energy source and the means by which it would be regulated. President Truman appointed David Lilienthal as the first Chairman of the AEC.[4]: 91–92 Congress gave the new civilian AEC extraordinary power and considerable independence to carry out its mission. To provide the AEC exceptional freedom in hiring its scientists and engineers, AEC employees were exempt from the civil service system. The AEC’s first order of business was to inspect the scattered empire of atomic plants and laboratories to be inherited from the U.S. Army.[6][page needed]
Because of the need for great security, all production facilities and nuclear reactors would be government-owned, while all technical information and research results would be under AEC control. The National Laboratory system was established from the facilities created under the Manhattan Project. Argonne National Laboratory was one of the first laboratories authorized under this legislation as a contractor-operated facility dedicated to fulfilling the new AEC’s missions.[citation needed] the Argonne was the first of the regional laboratories, to involve universities in the Chicago area. Others were the Clinton (CEW) labs and the Brookhaven National Laboratory in the Northeast, although a similar lab in Southern California did not eventuate.[9]
On 11 March 1948 Lilienthal and Kenneth Nichols were summoned to the White House where Truman told them “I know you two hate each other’s guts”. He directed that “the primary objective of the AEC was to develop and produce atomic weapons”, Nichols was appointed a major general and replaced Leslie Groves as chief of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP), previously Lilienthal had opposed his appointment. Lilienthal was told to “forgo your desire to place a bottle of milk on every doorstop and get down to the business of producing atomic weapons. [10] Nichols became General Manager of the AEC on 2 November 1953.[11]
The AEC was in charge of developing the U.S. nuclear arsenal, taking over these responsibilities from the wartime Manhattan Project. In its first decade, the AEC oversaw the operation of Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, devoted primarily to weapons development, and in 1952, the creation of new second weapons laboratory in California, the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The AEC also carried out the “crash program” to develop the hydrogen bomb (H-bomb), and the AEC played a key role in the prosecution of the Rosenbergs for espionage.
With Oppenheimer and Lilienthal removed, President Truman announced his decision to develop and produce the hydrogen bomb. The first test firing of an experimental H-bomb (“Ivy Mike“) was carried out in the Central Pacific on November 1, 1952, under President Truman. Furthermore, U.S. Navy Admiral Lewis. W. Strauss was appointed in 1953 by the new President Eisenhower as the Chairman of the AEC, to carry out the military development and production of the H-bomb.[12]
Lilienthal wanted to give high priority to peaceful uses, especially with nuclear power plants. However, coal was still cheap, and the electric power industry was not interested. The first experimental nuclear power plant was started in Pennsylvania under President Eisenhower in 1954.[13]
Dean received his J.D. from the University of Southern California in 1930 and an LL.M. from Duke University Law School in 1932. In 1934, Dean joined the U.S. Department of Justice during the New Deal administration of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Dean served under Attorneys General Homer S. Cummings and Frank Murphy as a Criminal Division attorney and press spokesperson. He had taught at Duke Law before being hired as assistant to Brien McMahon in the Criminal Division.[1] Dean helped draft expansions of the federal criminal law and defended them in cases argued before the United States Supreme Court. In 1940, Attorney General Robert H. Jackson made Dean the press spokesperson for the Department of Justice. After six years at Justice, Dean left to join McMahon’s law firm as partner.[1]
After World War II military service, Dean served as press spokesperson for now Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson who was the chief prosecutor in the Nuremberg Trials. Prior to his work with the AEC, Dean was professor of criminal law at the University of Southern California (1946–1949).
Dean was appointed by President Harry S. Truman to fill a vacancy on the Atomic Energy Commission, and he took his seat on May 24, 1949.[2] Dean had been recommended to Truman by McMahon,[3] who by this time had become Senator (elected in 1944), author of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, and chair of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee of Congress.
During August 1949–January 1950 there was a heated debate within the U.S. government and scientific community over whether to proceed with an accelerated development of the hydrogen bomb,[3] a nuclear weapon of massive and unprecedented force. Dean shared with McMahon and Truman a belief that the Soviet Union presented an immediate threat to the security of the United States, and that countering that threat with military superiority in the present was worth the costs of a longer-term arms race.[4] Accordingly, Dean was in October 1949 one of two AEC commissioners who supported proceeding with such development, against three who opposed it.[5] The AEC’s General Advisory Committee (GAC), chaired by J. Robert Oppenheimer, also opposed the H-bomb development. Dean supported the scope of the GAC report, which relied in part on moral grounds, but was not persuaded by the report itself, remarking to a scientist that the GAC members were behaving in the manner of a “bunch of college professors.”[3] The debate was decided in January 1950 when President Truman ordered the development to proceed.[5]
On July 11, 1950, Dean was announced as the new Chairman of the AEC.[6] He was the second chairman of the commission, following David Lilienthal, and the appointment was again with McMahon’s backing.[1] Dean assumed the post immediately.[2] As early as 1950, Dean advocated for the appointment of a Presidential Science Advisor and science advisory task force.[7] Dean was inherently skeptical about military requests, believing they often asked for arbitrary numbers without underlying rationales.[3] But as Cold War tensions heightened and the Korean War raged on, Dean led a massive expansion of the United States nuclear facilities. During his tenure as Chairman the A.E.C. successfully conducted the Ivy Mike test of the first hydrogen bomb.
Dean served at the time of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory‘s creation in 1952, having initially opposed the creation but then after a number of months, acceding to pressure for Teller from it to go forward.[5] Dean served for a brief period under President Dwight D. Eisenhower as well, staying until the completion of his term on June 30, 1953.[2]
During Dean’s tenure as Chairman, McCarthyism reached its peak. Shortly after Dean left the AEC, Oppenheimer came under attack by Lewis Strauss, Teller and others for his alleged foot-dragging at Los Alamos on the hydrogen bomb project. Dean was outraged at some of the accusations and false accounts being made by Strauss and his allies about the course of hydrogen bomb development.[3] At the Oppenheimer security hearing in 1954, Dean defended Oppenheimer.[5]
Upon leaving government service, Dean joined investment bankers Lehman Brothers. He became an executive of General Dynamics in 1955. Dean also became an active board member of the Fruehauf Trailer Company in Detroit.[8]
Raised in Richmond, Virginia, Strauss became an assistant to Herbert Hoover as part of relief efforts during and after World War I. Strauss then worked as an investment banker at Kuhn, Loeb & Co. during the 1920s and 1930s, where he amassed considerable wealth. As a member of the executive committee of the American Jewish Committee and several other Jewish organizations in the 1930s, Strauss made several attempts to change U.S. policy in order to accept more refugees from Nazi Germany but was unsuccessful. During World War II Strauss served as an officer in the U.S. Navy Reserve and rose to the rank of rear admiral due to his work in the Bureau of Ordnance in managing and rewarding plants engaged in production of munitions.
As a founding commissioner with the AEC during the early years of the Cold War, Strauss emphasized the need to protect U.S. atomic secrets and to monitor and stay ahead of atomic developments within the Soviet Union. As such Strauss was a strong proponent of developing the hydrogen bomb. During his stint as chairman of the AEC, Strauss urged the development of peaceful uses of atomic energy, including making an ill-advised prediction that atomic power would make electricity “too cheap to meter“. At the same time he minimized the possible health effects of radioactive fallout such as those experienced by Pacific Islanders following the Castle Bravo thermonuclear test.
Strauss was the driving force in the controversial hearings, held in April 1954 before an AEC Personnel Security Board, in which physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer‘s security clearance was revoked. As a result, Strauss has often been regarded as a villain in American history. President Dwight D. Eisenhower‘s nomination of Strauss to become U.S. Secretary of Commerce resulted in a prolonged, nationally visible political battle during 1959 and Strauss was not confirmed by the U.S. Senate.
Dynastic Successions Book 
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