Nixon Halderman

TRANSCRIPT OF A RECORDING OF A
MEETING AMONG THE PRESIDENT, JOHN
DEAN, AND H.R. HALDEMAN IN THE OVAL
OFFICE, ON MARCH 21, 1973, FROM
10:12 TO 11:55 AM
PRESIDENT: John, sit down, sit down.
DEAN: Good morning.
PRESIDENT: Well, what is the Dean summary of the day
about?
DEAN: John caught me on the way out and asked me
about why Gray was holding back on
information, if that was under instructions
from us. And it, uh, it was and it wasn’t.
Uh, it was instructions proposed by the
Attorney General, consistent with your press
conference statement that no further raw
data was to be turned over to the…
PRESIDENT: Full committee.
DEAN: …full committee.
PRESIDENT: Right.

---

Louis Patrick Gray III (July 18, 1916 – July 6, 2005) was Acting Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) from May 3, 1972 to April 27, 1973. During this time, the FBI was in charge of the initial investigation into the burglaries that sparked the Watergate scandal, which eventually led to the resignation of President Nixon. Gray was nominated as permanent Director by Nixon on February 15, 1973, but failed to win Senate confirmation.^[3] He resigned as Acting FBI director on April 27, 1973, after he admitted to destroying documents that had come from convicted Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt‘s safe—documents received on June 28, 1972, 11 days after the Watergate burglary, and given to Gray by White House counsel John Dean.^[4]

By 1960, Gray’s achievements in the Navy included commanding the U.S.S. Tiru (SS-416) and two other submarines on war patrols during the Korean War; earning the rank of captain two years before he was legally allowed to be paid for it; and serving as congressional liaison officer for the United States Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Chief of Naval Operations. He indicated his desire to retire from the Navy, but Chief of Naval Operations Arleigh Burke told him, “If you stay, you’ll have my job some day.”^[6] He did not stay, but joined a Connecticut law firm in 1961.

Department of Justice[edit]

In 1969, Gray returned to the federal government and worked under the Nixon administration in several different positions. In 1970, President Nixon appointed him as Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Division in the Department of Justice. In 1972, Gray was nominated to be Deputy Attorney General, but before he could be confirmed by the full United States Senate his nomination was withdrawn.

Acting Director of FBI[edit]

Instead, President Nixon designated him as Acting Director of the FBI after the death of J. Edgar Hoover. Gray served for less than a year. Day-to-day operational command of the Bureau remained with Associate Director Mark Felt.

Watergate involvement[edit]

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Watergate and the FBI’s investigation[edit]

On June 17, 1972, just six weeks after Gray took office at the FBI, five men were arrested after breaking into the Democratic National Committee headquarters at the Watergate hotel complex in Washington, D.C.

Gray first learned of the Watergate break-ins on June 17 from Wes Grapp, the Special Agent in Charge of the Los Angeles field office. Gray immediately called Mark Felt, his second in command. At the time, Felt only had limited information, remaining unclear as to whether it was a burglary or bombing attempt.^[8]

Felt had more information the next day, when he informed Gray that the burglars had connections to the Committee for the Re-Election of the President (CRP), that one burglar (McCord) was head of security for the committee, and that at least one listening device had been found. Gray recalled the conversation concluding with the exchange:

“Are you absolutely certain that we have jurisdiction?” I asked.

“I’m sure of it,” he [Felt] answered.

“Just check it and be absolutely certain,” I ordered. “And then investigate it to the hilt with no holds barred.”^[9]

On the same day, June 18, 1972, Gray also met later-identified Watergate conspirator Fred LaRue in California. The two discussed Watergate, according to LaRue, and made arrangements to meet again back in Washington, D.C.^[10] In his own memoir, Gray relates the LaRue meeting as a chance encounter at a hotel swimming pool and quotes their entire Watergate-related conversation:

“The Watergate thing is a hell of a thing,” he said.

“You bet it is, Fred,” I answered. “We’re going to investigate the hell out of it.”

That was all either of us said about it.^[11]

For the first six months of the investigation, Gray remained heavily involved. It was only when it became apparent that the White House was involved that Gray recused himself from the investigation and handed control over to Mark Felt.^[12]

Cover-up[edit]

On June 23, 1972, White House Chief of Staff Bob Haldeman and President Nixon held one of the infamous “smoking gun” conversations in which they conspired to use the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to block the FBI investigation into the money trail leading from the Watergate burglars to the Committee to Re-elect the President, which would constitute hard evidence that Committee members were involved in the planning of the burglaries.

According to Gray, this plan was first put into action when he had a meeting with Vernon Walters, then deputy director of the CIA, in which he quotes Walters as falsely saying, “If the investigation gets pushed further south of the border… it could trespass onto some of our covert projects. Since you’ve got these five men under arrest, it will be best to taper the matter off here.” This conversation implicitly stated that the FBI should not interview Manuel Ogarrio and Kenneth Dahlberg, individuals connected with the money used to fund the Watergate burglars.^[13]

This would later be backed up by the Director of the CIA, Richard Helms, when he specifically told Gray that Karl Wagner and John Caswell should also not be interviewed, as they were, he stated, active CIA agents at the time.^[14]

The basis for such a request came from a long-standing understanding between the CIA and the FBI that they would not reveal each other’s informants. This effort by the White House and the CIA succeeded in delaying the interviews of both Ogarrio and Dahlberg for a little more than one week, at which point Gray and his senior FBI staff, including Mark Felt, Charlie Bates, and Bob Kunkel, decided that, due to the increasing importance of these individuals in the investigation, they needed a written request from the CIA not to interview them, which would have to state in greater detail the reasons for not interviewing these individuals. Once the decision was made, Gray called Vernon Walters and demanded that written request the next morning, or he would order the interviews to go forth.^[15]

The next morning, Vernon Walters arrived and delivered a three-page memorandum, marked “SECRET”, that did not ask the FBI to hold off on the interviews. The meeting concluded with Walters suggesting to Gray that he should warn the President that some members of the White House staff were hindering the FBI’s investigation. After the conversation, Gray ordered the interviews to proceed immediately.^[16]

Ultimately, the CIA cover-up delayed the FBI investigation no more than two weeks.

While not active in any Watergate activities per se, Gray was aware through his dealings with John Dean that the White House was concerned about what might be discovered from a full-field FBI investigation and explored what he could do to limit the investigation or shift it away from the Bureau’s jurisdiction.^[17] As Dean wrote in his Watergate memoir “Blind Ambition,” he used Gray as a shill knowing that “we could count on Pat Gray to keep the Hunt material from becoming public, and he did not disappoint us.”^[18] In fact, even though he thought of this as a political not criminal situation and that he was ultimately serving the President as the “nation’s chief law enforcement officer,” Gray would come dangerously close to collusion because he chose to be useful to the White House without asking the hard questions. Dean goes on to say, “I met Pat Gray secretly at his home in southwest Washington. We were both apprehensive about the meeting as we walked to a park and sat down on a bench overlooking the Potomac, discussing my request to obtain FBI 302s and AirTels on the Watergate investigation.”^[18]

---

MARCH 21, 1973, FROM 10:12 TO 11:55 A.M. 2
DEAN: …he does it to harm you in any way, sir.
PRESIDENT: He’s just quite stubborn and — he’s quite
stubborn; also he isn’t very smart. You
know he and I–
DEAN: He’s bullheaded.
PRESIDENT: He’s smart in his own way, but…
DEAN: Yeah.
PRESIDENT: …but he’s got that typical, “Well, by God,
this is right and they’re not going to do
it.”
DEAN: That’s why he thinks he’ll be confirmed,
because he thinks he’s being, he’s being his
own man He’s being forthright, honest. He’s
feels he has turned over too much and so
it’s a conscious decision that he is harming
the Bureau by doing this and so he’s not
going to–
PRESIDENT: (Sighs) I hope to God that we can get off
(unintelligible) though today, this is
because the White House told him to do this
and that other thing. And also, I told
Ehrlichman, I don’t see why our little boys
can’t make something out of the fact that,
God darn it, this is the, this is the, the
only responsible decision you could possibly
make. The FBI cannot turn over raw files.
Has anybody made that point? I’ve tried…
MARCH 21, 1973 -FROM 10:12 TO 11:55 A.M. 3
DEAN: Sam Ervin has made that point himself.
PRESIDENT: Did he?
DEAN: Uh, in fact, in reading the transcript of
Gray’s hearings, Ervin tried to hold Gray
back from doing what he was doing at the
time he did it. Uh, I thought it was very
unwise. I don’t think that anyone is
criticizing…
PRESIDENT: Well, let’s say —
DEAN: … your position on it.
PRESIDENT: Let’s make the point, let’s make the point
that the raw files cannot be turned over.
Well, I think that point should be made.
DEAN: That, that–
PRESIDENT: (Background noises) We are standing for the
rights of innocent individuals. The
American Civil Liberty Union is against it.
We’re against it. (Unintelligible)
tradition, and it will continue to be the
tradition that all files are — I’d like to
turn them (Unintelligible) let them see what
is in one.
DEAN: How damaging–
PRESIDENT: Any further word on, on Sullivan? Is he
still–
MARCH 21, 1973, FROM 10:12 TO 11:55 A.M. 4
DEAN: Yeah, he’s, he’s going to be over to see me
today, this morning, hopefully, some-time.
Uh–
PRESIDENT: As soon as you get that, I’ll be available
to talk to you this afternoon.
DEAN: All right, sir.
PRESIDENT: I’ll be busy until about one o’clock; after
that we can contact. Anytime you’re through
I would like to see whatever thing he has.
Well, he’ 5 got something, but I’d like-to
just see what it is.
DEAN: Uh, the reason I thought we ought to talk
this morning is because in, in our
conversations, uh, uh, I have, I have the
impression that you don’t know everything I
know
PRESIDENT: That’s right.
DEAN: …and it makes it very difficult for you to
make judgments that, uh, that only you can
make…
PRESIDENT: That’s right.
DEAN: … on some of these things and I thought
that–
PRESIDENT: You’ve got, in other words, I’ve got to know
why you feel that, uh, that something…
DEAN: Well, let me…
PRESIDENT: …that, that we shouldn’t unravel
something.
MARCH 21, 1973, FROM 10:12 TO 11:55 A.M. 5
DEAN: …let me give you my overall first.
PRESIDENT: In other words, you, your judgment as to
where it stands, and where we go now—
DEAN: I think, I think that, uh, there’s no doubt
about the seriousness of the problem we’re,
we’ve got. We have a cancer–within, close
to the Presidency, that’s growing. It’s
growing daily. It’s compounding, it grows
geometrically now because it compounds
itself. Uh, that’ll be clear as I explain
you know, some of the details, uh, of why it
is, and it basically is because (1) we’re
being blackmailed; (2) uh, people are going
to start perjuring themself very quickly
that have not had to perjure themselves to
protect other people and the like. And that
is just–and there is no assurance–
PRESIDENT: That it won’t bust.
DEAN: That, that won’t bust.
PRESIDENT: True.
DEAN: So, let me give you the sort of basic facts’
talking first about the Watergate; and then
about Segretti; and then about some of the
peripheral items that, uh, have come up.
First of all, on, on the Watergate: How did
it all start, where did it start? It
started with an instruction to me from Bob
Haldeman to see if we couldn’t set up a
perfectly legitimate campaign intelligence
operation over at the Re-election Committee.
MARCH 21, 1973, FROM 10:12 TO 11:55 A.M. 6
PRESIDENT: Hmm.
DEAN: Not being in this business, I turned to
somebody who had been in this business, Jack
Caulfield, who is, I don’t know if you
remember Jack or not. He was your original
bodyguard before
PRES IDENT: Yeah.
DEAN: …they had…
PRESIDENT: Yeah.
DEAN: …candidate, candidate…
PRESIDENT: Yeah.
DEAN: …protection, an old New York City
policeman.
PRESIDENT: Right, I know, I know him.
DEAN: Uh, Jack had worked for John and then was
transferred to my office. I said, “Jack,
come up with a plan that, you know, is a
normal infiltration, I mean, you know,
buying informa- tion from secretaries and
all that sort of thing.” He did, he put
together a plan. It was kicked around, and,
uh, I went to Ehrlichman with it. I went to
Mitchell with it, and the consensus was that
Caulfield wasn’t the man to do this. Uh, in
retrospect, that might have been a bad call,
’cause he is an incredibly cautious person
and, and wouldn’t have put the situation to
where it is today.
MARCH 21, 1973, FROM 10:12 TO 11:55 A.M. 7
PRESIDENT: Yeah.
DEAN: All right, after rejecting that, they said,
“We still need something,” so I was told to
look around for somebody that could go over
to 1701 and do this. And that’s when I came
up with Gordon Liddy, who– they needed a
lawyer. Gordon had an intelligence background from his FBI service. I was aware of
the fact that he had done some extremely
sensitive things for the White House while
he’d been at the White House, and he had
apparently done them well. Uh, going out
into Ellsberg’s doctor’s office…
PRESIDENT: Oh, yeah.
DEAN: … and things like this. He’d worked with
leaks. He’d, you know, tracked these things
down. Uh, and (coughs) so the report that I
got from Krogh was that he was a hell of a
good man and, and not only that, a good
lawyer, uh, and could set up a proper
operation. So we talked to Liddy. Liddy
was interested in doing it. Took, uh, Liddy
over to meet Mitchell. Mitchell thought
highly of him because, apparently, Mitchell
was partially involved in his ev–coming to
the White House to work for, for Krogh. Uh,
Liddy had been at Treasury before that.
Then Liddy was told to put together his
plan, you know, how he would run an
intelligence operation. And this was after
he was hired over there at the, uh, the
Committee. Magruder called me in January
and said, “I’d like to have you come over
and see Liddy’s plan.”
MARCH 21, 1973 FROM 10:12 TO 11:55 A.M. 8
PRESIDENT: January of ’72?
DEAN: January of ’72. (Background noises) Like,
“You come over to Mitchell’s office and sit
in on a meeting where Liddy is going to lay
his plan out.” I said, “Well, I don’t really
know as I’m the man, but if you want me
there I’ll be happy to.” (Clears throat) So,
I came over and Liddy laid out a million
dollar plan that was the most incredible
thing I have ever laid my eyes on. All in
codes, and involved black bag operations,
kidnapping, providing prostitutes, uh, to
weaken the opposition, bugging, uh, mugging
teams. It was just an incredible thing.
(Clears throat)
PRESIDENT: But, uh…
DEAN: And–
PRESIDENT: …that was, that was not, uh…
DEAN: No.
PRESIDENT: …discussed with…
DEAN: No.
PRESIDENT: …other persons.
DEAN: No, not at all. And–
PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible)
DEAN: Uh, Mitchell, Mitchell just virtually sat
there puffing and laughing. I could tell
’cause after he–after Liddy left the office
MARCH 21, 1973, FROM 10:12 TO 11:55 A.M. 9
I said, “That’s the most incredible thing
I’ve ever seen.” He said, ” I agree.” And so
then he was told to go back to the draw-ing
boards and come up with something realistic.
So there was a second meeting. Uh, they
asked me to come over to that. I came into
the tail end of the meeting. I wasn’t there
for the first part. I don’t know how long
the meeting lasted. Uh, at this point, they
were discussing again bugging, kidnapping
and the like. And at this point I said,
right in front of everybody, very clearly, I
said, “These are not the sort of things (1)
that are ever to be discussed in the office
of the Attorney General of the United
States”–where he still was–“and I am
personally incensed.” I was trying to get
Mitchell off the hook, uh, ’cause–
PRESIDENT: I know.
DEAN: He’s a, he’s a nice person, doesn’t like to
say no under–when people he’s going to have
to work with.
PRESIDENT: That’s right.
DEAN: So, I let, I let it be known. I said, “You
all pack that stuff up and get it the hell
out of here ’cause we just, you just can’t
talk this way in this office and you
shouldn’t, you shouldn’t, you should reexamine your whole thinking.” Came back–
PRESIDENT: Who else was present? Be-, besides you–
MARCH 21, 1973, FROM 10:12 TO 11:55 A.M. 10
DEAN: It was Magruder, Magruder–
PRESIDENT: Magruder.
DEAN: Uh, Mitchell, Liddy and myself. I came back
right after the meeting and told Bob, I
said, “Bob, we’ve got a growing disaster on
our hands if they’re thinking this way.’ and
I said, “The Unite House has got to stay out
of this and I, frankly, am not going to be
involved in it.” He said, “I agree John.”
And, I thought, at that point the thing was
turned off. That’s the last I heard of it,
when I thought it was turned off, because it
was an absurd proposal.
PRESIDENT: Yeah.
DEAN: Liddy-I did have dealings with him
afterwards. We never talked about it. Now
that would be hard to believe for some
people, but, uh, we never did. Just the
fact of the matter.
PRESIDENT: Well, you were talking about other things.
DEAN: Other things. We had so many other things.
PRESIDENT: He had some legal problems at one time.
DEAN: Now (coughs)–
PRESIDENT: But you were his advisor, and I, I
understand how you could have some, uh, what
cam–what are they campaign laws–I knew
that was you, you have–Haldeman told me
you, that you were heading all of that up
for us. Go ahead.
MARCH 21, 1973 FROM 10:12 TO 11:55 A.M. 11
DEAN: Now. (Clears Throat). So, Liddy went back
after that and it was over, over at, uh,
1701, the Committee, and I, this is where I
come into having put the pieces together
after the fact as to what I can put together
what happened. Liddy sat over there and
tried to come up with another plan that he
could sell. (1) They were talking, saying
to him he was asking for too much money, and
I don’t think they were discounting the, the
illegal points at this, after–you know.
Jeb is not a lawyer and he didn’t know
whether this was the way the game was played
or not, and what it was all about. They
came up with, apparently, another plan, uh,
but they couldn’t get it approved by anybody
over there. So, Liddy and Hunt apparently
came to see Chuck Colson, and Chuck Colson
picked up the telephone and called Magruder
and said, “You all either fish or cut bait.
Uh, this is absurd to have these guys over
there and not using them, and if you’re not
going to use them, I may use them.” Things
of this nature.
PRESIDENT: When was this?
DEAN: This was apparently in February of ’72.
PRESIDENT: That could be. Colson know what they were
talking about?
DEAN: I can only assume, because of his close
relation-ship with…
PRESIDENT: Hunt.
MARCH 21, 1973 FROM 10:12 TO 11:55 A M. 12
DEAN: …Hunt, he had a damn good idea of what
they were talking about, a damn good idea.
He would probably deny it, deny it today and
probably get away with denying it. But I,
uh, I still–
PRESIDENT: Unless Hunt–
DEAN: Unless Hunt, uh, blows on him–
PRESIDENT: But then Hunt isn’t enough. I takes two
doesn’t it?
DEAN: Probably. Probably. But Liddy was there
also and if, if Liddy were to blow–
PRESIDENT: Then you’ve got a problem–I was thinking
(unintelligible}the criminal liability goes.
DEAN: Yeah.
PRESIDENT: Okay.
DEAN: I’ll go back over that, and tell (noise) you
where I think the, the soft spots are.
PRESIDENT: Colson then, then Colson then, do you think
was the, uh, was the person who…
DEAN: I think he…
PRESIDENT: …pushed?
MARCH 21 1973, FROM 10:12 TO 11:55 A.M. 13
DEAN: I think he helped to get the push, get the
thing off the dime. Now something else
occurred, though —
PRESIDENT: Did Colson–did he talk to anybody here?
DEAN: No. I think this was an independent …
PRESIDENT: Did he talk to Haldeman?
DEAN: No. I don’t think so. Now, but here’s the
other thing, where the next thing comes in
the chain: I think that Bob was assuming
that they had something that was proper over
there, some intelligence gathering operation
that Liddy was operating. And through
Strachan, uh, who was his tickler, uh, he
started pushing them
PRESIDENT: (Sighs) yeah.

---

Nixon and Halderman wonder “Did Colson blow, did Liddy? Hunt?”

Charles Wendell Colson (October 16, 1931 – April 21, 2012), generally referred to as Chuck Colson, was an American attorney and political advisor who served as Special Counsel to PresidentRichard Nixon from 1969 to 1970. Once known as President Nixon‘s “hatchet man”, Colson gained notoriety at the height of the Watergate scandal, for being named as one of the Watergate Seven, and also for pleading guilty to obstruction of justice for attempting to defame Pentagon Papers defendant Daniel Ellsberg.^[1] In 1974, he served seven months in the federal Maxwell Prison in Alabama, as the first member of the Nixon administration to be incarcerated for Watergate-related charges.^[2]

These were those tied to the JFK Hit. Charlses Colson autogbiography.

PRESIDENT: They had never bugged Muskie, though, did
they?
DEAN: No, they hadn’t but they had a, they had,
uh, they’d…
PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible).
DEAN: …infiltrated it by a, a, they had…
PRESIDENT: A secretary.
DEAN: …a secretary and a

William Robert Greer (September 22, 1909 – February 23, 1985) was an agent of the U.S. Secret Service, best known as being the driver of President John F. Kennedy‘s presidential limousine in the motorcade through Dealey Plaza in Dallas on November 22, 1963, when the president was assassinated.

History

Greer was born on a farm in Stewartstown, County Tyrone, Ireland, and emigrated to the United States in 1929.

Stewartstown is a small town in County Tyrone, Northern Ireland, close to Lough Neagh and about 5 miles (8 km) from Cookstown, 3 miles (5 km) from Coalisland and 7 miles (11 km) from Dungannon. Established by Scottish Planters early in the 17th century, its population peaked before the Great Famine of the 1840s at over 1000. In the 2011 Census the town had a population of 650 people.

He worked for over a decade as a chauffeur and servant to several wealthy families, including the Lodge family in Boston and a family in Dobbs Ferry, New York. During World War II, Greer enlisted in the U.S. Navy and was assigned to the presidential yacht in May, 1944. After his discharge in 1945, he joined the United States Secret Service on October 1 of that year.^[1]

Greer’s duties brought him into close contact with Kennedy, and he can be seen in several pictures with the Kennedy family. He chauffeured the president on many occasions, including in Dallas. As with all agents involved, there has much speculation about, and criticism of, his actions on that day. Greer testified before the Warren Commission on March 9, 1964.^[2]

Greer retired on disability from the Secret Service in 1966 due to a stomach ulcer that grew worse following the Kennedy assassination.^[3][4] In 1973 he relocated to Waynesville, North Carolina,^[5] where he died of cancer.

PRESIDENT: I suppose you’re–
DEAN: Now, so the information was coming over here
and then, uh, I finally, after –the next
point in time where I became aware of
anything was on June 17th, when I got word
that there had been this break-in at the
Democratic National Committee and somebody
from the Committee had been caught, uh, from
our Committee had been caught in the DNC.
And I said, “Oh, my God, that, I can only”,
you know, if, instantly putting the pieces
together–(Coughs)
PRESIDENT: You knew what it was.
DEAN: I knew what it was. So I called Liddy, uh,
on that Monday morning, and I said, “Gordon”

• I said, “first, I want to know if anybodyin the White House was involved in this.”
  And he said, “No.” And they weren’t. I
  said,
  MARCH 21, 1973 FROM 10:12 TO 11:55 A.M. 16
  “Well, I want to know how in God’s name-this
  happened.” And he said, “Well, I was pushed
  without mercy by Magruder to get in there,
  get more information–that the information,
  it was not satisfactory. Magruder said,
  ‘The White House is not happy with what
  we’re getting.”‘
  PRESIDENT: The White House?
  DEAN: The White House. Yeah, Uh–
  PRESIDENT: Who do you think was pushing him?
  DEAN: Well, I think it was probably Strachan
  thinking that Bob wanted things,(cough) and
  because because I have seen that happen on
  other occasions where things have been said
  to be Of very prime importance when they
  really weren’t.
  PRESIDENT: Why (unintelligible) I wonder? I’m just
  try-ing to think as to why then. We’d just
  finished the Moscow trip. I mean, we were–
  DEAN: That’s right.
  PRESIDENT: The Democrats had just nominated Mc G-, Mc
  Govern. I mean, for Christ’s sakes, I mean,
  what the hell were we–I mean, I can see
  doing it earlier but I mean, now let me say,
  I can see the pressure, but I don’t see why
  all the pressure would have been one then.
  MARCH 21, 1973, FROM 10:12 TO 11:55 A.M. 17
  DEAN: I don’t know, other than the fact that, uh,
  they might have been looking for information
  about
  PRESIDENT: The convention.
  DEAN: …the conventions.
  PRESIDENT: Well, that’s right.
  DEAN: Because, I understand, also after the fact,
  that there was a plan to bug Larry O’Brien’s
  suite down in Florida.
  PRESIDENT: Yeah.
• DEAN: Uh, so, uh, Liddy told me, that uh, you
• know, this is what had happened and, and
• this is why it had happened.
• PRESIDENT: Liddy told you he was planning–where’d you
• learn there was such a plan–from whom?
• DEAN: Beg your pardon.
• PRESIDENT: Where did you learn of the plans to bug
• Larry O’Brien’s suite?
• DEAN: From Magruder, after the, long after the
• fact.
• PRESIDENT: Oh, Magruder, he knows.
• DEAN: Yeah. Magruder is totally knowledgeable on
• the whole thing.
• PRESIDENT: Yeah.
• MARCH 21, 1973, FROM 10:12 TO 11:55 A.M. 18
• DEAN: All right, now, we’ve gone through the
• trial. We’ve–I don’t know if Mitchell has
• perjured himself in the Grand Jury or not.
• I’ve never–
• PRESIDENT: Who?
• DEAN: Mitchell. I don’t know how much knowledge
• he actually had. I know that Magruder has
• perjured himself in the Grand Jury. I know
• that Porter has perjured himself, uh, in the
• Grand Jury.
• PRESIDENT: Porter (Unintelligible).
• DEAN: He’s one of Magruder’s deputies.
• PRESIDENT: Yeah.

DEAN: This may result…this may happen even
without our calling for it, when, uh, when
these, uh…
PRESIDENT: Vesco?
DEAN: No. Well, that’s one possibility. But
also, when these people go back before the
Grand Jury, here, they are going to pull all
these criminal defendants back in before the
Grand Jury and immunize them
PRESIDENT: And immunize them: Why? Who? Are you going
to…on what?
DEAN: Uh, the U. S. Attorney’s Office will.
PRESIDENT: To do what?
DEAN: To talk about anything further they want to
talk about.
PRESIDENT: Yeah. What do they gain out of it?
DEAN: Nothing.
MARCH 21, 1973 FROM 10:12 TO 11:55 A.M. 91
PRESIDENT: To hell with then.
DEAN: They, they’re going to stonewall it, uh, as
it now stands. Except for Hunt. That’s
why, that’s the leverage in his threat.
HALDEMAN: This is Hunt’s opportunity.
DEAN: This is Hunt’s opportunity.
PRESIDENT: That’s why, that’s why…
HALDEMAN: God, if he can lay this…
PRESIDENT: that’s why your, for your immediate thing
you’ve got no choice with Hunt but the
hundred and twenty or whatever it is.
Right?
DEAN: That’s right.
PRESIDENT: Would you agree that that’s a buy time
thing, you better damn well get that done,
but fast?
DEAN: I think he ought to be given some signal
anyway, to, to…
PRESIDENT Yes.
DEAN: Yeah…you know.
PRESIDENT: Well, for Christ’s sakes, get it fir, a, in
a way that, uh (pause) who’s, who’s going to
talk to him? Colson? He’s the one who’s
supposed to know him.
DEAN: Well, Colson doesn’t have any money though.
That’s the thing. That’s been our, one of
the real problems. They have, uh, been
unable to raise any money. A million
dollars in cash, or, or the like, has been
Just a very difficult problem as we’ve
discussed before. Apparently, Mitchell has
talked to Pappas, and I called him
MARCH 21, 1973 FROM 10:12 TO 11:55 A.M. 92
last…John asked me to call him last night
after our discussion and after you’d met
with John to see where that was. And I, I
said, “Have you talked to, to Pappas?” He
was at home, and Martha picked up the phone
so it was all in, in code. “Did you talk to
the Greek?” And he said, uh, “Yes, I have.”
And I said, “Is the Greek bearing gifts?” He
said, “‘tell, I `’ant to call you tomorrow
on that.”
PRESIDENT: Well, look, uh, what is it that you need on
that, uh, when, uh, uh? Now look
(unintelligible) I am, uh unfamiliar with
the money situation.
DEAN: Well that, you know it, it sounds easy to
do, apparently, until, uh, everyone is out
there doing it and that’s where our
breakdown has, has come every time.
PRESIDENT: Well, if you had it, where would you, how
would you get it to somebody?
DEAN: Well, I, uh, I gather LaRue just leaves it
in mail boxes and things like that, and
tells Hunt to go pick it up. Someone phones
Hunt and tells him to pick it up. As I say’
we’re a bunch of amateurs in that business.
HALDEMAN: That was the thing that we thought Mitchell
ought to be able to know holy to find somebody who could do all that sort of thing,
because none of us know how to.
DEAN: That’s right. You got to wash money and all
that sort, you know, if you get a hundred
thousand out of a bank, and it all comes in
serialized bills, and…
PRESIDENT: Oh, I understand.
DEAN: And that means you have